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I. INTRODUCTION: THEORIZING TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
“[C]onstitutional reform . . . is . . . an exercise of sovereignty. . . . With constitutional reform we’re talking about 
Indian nations doing what they have to do . . . to address common problems . . . . The question should be, . . . as a 
truly sovereign nation, is this constitution, this form of government, acceptable to us? To our people? That should be the 
question. And that should be the only question. And if it is acceptable to our people, . . . then it is and that’s the way 
it should be. That is sovereignty.” 
-- Hon. Albert Hale, Former President, Navajo Nation1 
 
 Today is an exciting time for constitutional reform within the United States. American Indian 
tribes—numbering 566 recognized by the federal government and an additional 100 tribes recognized by 
state governments—have engaged in a substantial wave of constitutional amendment and reform, 
motivated to establish genuinely self-governing institutions and necessitated by the influx of economic 
development in Indian Country. The frequency of constitutional redevelopment perhaps rivals the pace 
of tribal constitution drafting during the era of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). The 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs at that time remarked that the writing of tribal constitutions happening 
was “probably the greatest in number ever written in an equivalent length of time in the history of the 
world.”2 
 
 Although many tribes possessed full-scale constitutions—written or otherwise—well before the 
IRA,3 that Act established a federal government policy and process for adopting tribal constitutions. The 
Act also resulted in both the quick dispatch of field staff to Indian reservations to provide technical 
assistance as well as the attention of Washington bureaucrats, who made legal suggestions and revisions.4 
Ultimately, ninety-seven tribes adopted IRA constitutions between October 1935 and January 1939; 
countless others adopted constitutions through the IRA-defined process; and just under 200 possess 
written constitutions today.5 
                                                
1  Albert Hale, Firsthand Account: Why Engage in Constitutional Reform?, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 83, 84–85 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
2  JOHN COLLIER, FROM EVERY ZENITH: A MEMOIR 177 (1963). 
3  David Wilkins suggests that sixty tribes had constitutions or “documents in the nature of constitutions” on 
file with the Department of the Interior prior to the IRA, at least forty of which predated the New Deal era entirely. 
David Wilkins, Introduction to Felix S. Cohen, On the Drafting of Tribal Constitutions, in AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 145 
(Matthew L.M. Fletcher ed., 2011). 
4 DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL PLURALISM 105 (2007). 
5  Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 704 n.153 
(1989); Felix S. Cohen, Indians at Work, in AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 143 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher ed., 2011).  
Elmer Rusco makes the worthwhile point that the continuing large gap between Indian tribes and the number of written 
constitutions—with roughly only one-third of organized tribes possessing written constitutions—suggests there remains 
2013             COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 75 
  
 
 A growing body of contemporary scholarship documenting tribal constitutions has been 
forming, but much of this scholarship has focused on the substantive structures of tribal governments 
being overhauled: the use of separation of powers principles in light of the troubles with overly 
authoritarian and unitary tribal councils; the need for an independent judiciary; and the crafting of 
membership requirements.6 However, with limited exceptions, the scholarship has focused less on the 
processes of tribal constitution drafting. Tribes amending existing constitutions or adopting wholly new 
governing documents do so against the backdrop of existing-yet-outdated IRA constitutions, under the 
federal government’s prevalent supervision, and frequently in response to major crises in tribal 
government. In this process, tribes make important decisions regarding the frequency and scope of 
future constitutional reform and the mechanisms they employ to enact reforms. These decisions affect 
the success of any constitutional rewriting and communicate the significance and goals of 
constitutionalism within the tribal context. 
 
 Of course, tribes in the United States that are engaged in the constitutional amendment or 
reform process do not possess the unbounded sovereignty of a separate and independent nation. Since 
early Supreme Court jurisprudence, Indian tribes have operated with a special status termed “domestic 
dependent nations.”7 Despite a Constitution that treats tribes largely as separate entities,8 tribes’ 
dependent sovereign status has been continually reaffirmed and rearticulated in recent Supreme Court 
decisions. Most notably, Indian tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians;9 they 
possess little civil jurisdiction over non-Indians except under exceptional circumstances;10 and Congress, 
under the plenary power doctrine, may legislate regarding Indian tribes with virtually unbridled 
discretion, leaving tribes unable to invoke even the United States Constitution as a limitation.11  
 
In accordance with the significant limitations on tribal sovereignty, much scholarship on tribal 
constitutions focuses on the role of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) in approving tribal constitutions or amendments, viewing the resulting documents as inauthentic 
expressions of tribal self-governance.12 For many tribes, constitutional provisions have been enacted not 
just through tribal expressions of popular sovereignty, but through significant pressure from a sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                       
much to learn about non-written or non-constitutional governance among tribes. Elmer Rusco, The Indian Reorganization 
Act and Indian Self-Government, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE 
NATIONS 49, 74 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006).   
6  See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS (Eric 
D. Lemont ed., 2006) (largely focusing on historical and substantive accounts of tribal reform or issues regarding the 
citizenship and legitimacy of tribal governments); MIRIAM JORGENSEN, REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES 
FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (2007). 
7  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
8  Resnik, supra note 5, at 691 (“To the extent Indian tribes are discussed in the Constitution, they seem to be 
recognized as having a status outside its parameters. Indian tribes are treated as entities with whom to have commerce 
and to make treaties.”). 
9  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
10  See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (noting that the Crow Indian tribe had power to regulate 
hunting and fishing of non-Indians in tribal lands, but not non-Indian lands within the reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353 (2001) (not falling under limited exception, tribal court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate allegedly tortuous 
act occurring on-reservation by state warden); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 
(2008) (holding that tribal court lacked jurisdiction over discrimination claim against a non-Indian over sale of fee land). 
11  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or 
eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.); id. at 58 (“This aspect of tribal 
sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress.”). 
12 Rusco, supra note 5 (“Graham D. Taylor and several other scholars have argued that [the IRA] forced cookie-
cutter non-Native governments on most tribes or nations.”); FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (2007). 
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hostile separate sovereign. For example, although Congress ultimately rejected mandatory secretarial 
approval of every tribe’s constitution or proposed amendment, many tribes nonetheless included such 
provisions in their constitution, whether in part because of BIA pressure or the security of federal 
support.13 Other scholars emphasize the BIA’s development of a “model constitution,” which it 
expected tribes to adopt with only minor adjustments.14 
 
By contrast, this Essay advocates viewing tribal constitutional change through the lens of tribal 
agency, albeit agency situated within and limited by the super-sovereign federal government. Similar to 
Judith Resnik’s approach to tribal courts and the federal court system, this Essay argues that tribal 
constitutions must be understood as “a product of the interaction between tribal customs and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Interior, and federal Indian policy.”15 Tribes remain 
(involuntarily) dependent, and have molded constitutions under the sometimes strong-arm of the federal 
government, but tribes’ contemporary efforts to draft new constitutions remain both engaged with and 
resistant to this super-sovereign. As Resnik notes, “[t]here are assimilationist pressures but not complete 
assimilation. Something more than subdivisions of the federal government currently exist.”16 
 
To better understand the present condition of tribal constitutional change and its implications 
for tribal governance within the federal system, this Essay will examine the processes of constitutional 
amendment and reform within the American Indian tribal context. First, Part II reviews the history of 
tribal constitution writing. In particular, Part II.A explores the existence of tribal constitutions, or similar 
documents, prior to the Indian Reorganization Act. Part II.B recounts the IRA’s process of tribal 
constitution drafting, which standardized procedures for drafting and amending constitutions and 
continues to exert considerable influence over tribal constitutional change today, while Part II.C assesses 
the impact and success of the IRA constitution-drafting project. Part II.D reviews the present moment 
of frequent constitutional rewriting in light of increased tribal self-governance. 
 
Part III then examines tribal constitutional amendment and reform through a comparative 
analysis with United States federal and state constitutions, as well as through theory on subnational 
constitutional systems. While an imperfect analogy, emphasizing tribal constitutions’ role in a subnational 
system helps to explain important structural aspects about tribal constitutions, such as their relative ease 
of amendment.17  
                                                
13 Resnik, supra note 5, at 712 n.186; 713 n.189 (noting that the Supreme Court’s preemption doctrine might 
result in advantages to Indian tribes from federal involvement in tribal constitution drafting). 
14 GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM 37 (1980). Rusco, supra note 5, at 
74, rejects the notion of a “model constitution,” suggesting that non-lawyer employees within the BIA developed rough 
drafts of constitutions with Native leaders prior to the involvement of Washington D.C.-based attorneys, and that the 
BIA specifically decided not to prepare a model constitution. 
15 Resnik, supra note 5, at 734. 
16 Id. at 750. Compare the federal influence on IRA constitutions with the South African Constitution, which 
prescribes a model for provincial constitutions to adopt within the national constitution and allocates an ongoing role 
for federal judicial review of all subnational constitutional changes prior to their taking effect, clearly defining and 
limiting the permissible range of local variation. See Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A 
View from the States, Provinces, Regions, Länder and Cantons, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND 
MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 7–9 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams & Josef Marko eds., 2004). 
17 For his part, IRA architect Felix Cohen explicitly stated that many governmental functions included in tribal 
constitutions were modeled on municipalities. David E. Wilkins, Introduction to FELIX COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF 
TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xi, xxii (2007) (noting Cohen suggested tribal governments were “to be like town governments, 
except that they would have federal protection and their special rights”). Although many tribes may possess the 
population size of small towns, larger tribes possess population sizes closer to small states. For example, the 2010 U.S. 
Census reported 287,000 people identify as Navajo, with an on-reservation population of 173,667 and 284,247 people 
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Part III begins by examining the frequency and scope of tribal constitutional change. Part III.A 
focuses on constitutional amendments, or small-scale changes to existing constitutions. This section 
considers provisions, such as mere majority vote provisions and voter initiative capabilities, that make 
constitutional amendment relatively frequent, as well as provisions that limit amendment, such as the 
widespread requirement for approval from the Secretary of the Interior prior to changes taking effect. In 
particular, section III.A considers the Cherokee Nation’s more than twenty-year-long attempt to adopt a 
new constitution, approved by tribal voters in 2003. This pursuit ultimately failed because of a voluntarily 
included provision in the previous Cherokee constitution requiring secretarial approval. 
 
Part III.B focuses on reform, or more wholesale constitutional change. It considers the 
circumstances motivating frequent tribal constitutional reform today through a case study of the 
Cherokee Nation Constitutional Convention and reform process from 1999 until 2003. Among the 
factors motivating the drafting of entirely new constitutions are the need for a plethora of new 
governance provisions, major governance disputes within the existing tribal government, and the 
difficulties of defining eligible tribal members and reform participants. 
 
Part IV concludes by suggesting that federal influence on tribal constitutional drafting is not 
unidirectional, making tribal constitutions an important site for understanding the larger American 
constitutional landscape. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: SITUATING TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 
 
A. A Once Strong Tradition of Sovereignty 
 
 Prior to the arrival of European settlers in North America, Native American peoples exercised 
largely independent and uninterrupted sovereignty on their traditional lands.18 Governance often did not 
occur on the level of the entire tribe or nation but instead through loose and decentralized forms such as 
villages, lineages, clans, and bands.19 Subgroups exercised considerable independence, and a consensus-
oriented decision-making model tended to encourage groups to separate and make their own decisions 
rather than enforce a majority will upon a dissenting minority.20 
 
 Although most tribes did not govern through formal constitutions, approximately sixty tribes 
had constitutions or similar documents on file with the Department of the Interior prior to the federal 
policy of encouraging and establishing tribal governments ushered in by the IRA.21 The earliest tribal 
constitutions included creation stories and other narratives that described fundamental community 
                                                                                                                                                       
identify as Cherokee. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS BRIEF: THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE 
POPULATION, at 14, 17, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf.  
18 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 123–124 (1998) (noting that in early United States history 
“the Indian territory was entirely the province of the tribes, and they had jurisdiction in fact and theory over all persons 
and subjects present there.”). 
19 Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions: Meeting the Challenges of Tradition, Colonialism, and Globalization, 
in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 11, 14 (Eric D. Lemont 
ed., 2006). 
20 Id. 
21 Wilkins, supra note 17, at xxi. At least forty of these documents predated the New Deal era entirely, although 
many tribes began to adopt constitutions when it became clear that federal policy would encourage such documents 
prior to the official passage of the IRA. 
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values and governance structures.22 Although never proven, some claim that the United States 
Constitution’s preamble was inspired in part by a Haudenosaunee treaty from 1520, which began “We, 
the people, to form a union, to establish peace, equity, and order. . . .”23 South Carolina’s John Rutledge, 
Chairman of the Committee of Detail at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, apparently 
admired the Iroquois legal system and read from the treaty to open a session of the Convention.24 
 
 Even prior to the IRA, tribes’ desire and need to earn credibility from and manage relations with 
the federal government resulted in some of the first written tribal constitutions. Several Southeastern 
tribes adopted constitutions in the first half of the nineteenth century to manage relations with the 
United States government.25 For example, the Cherokee Nation, motivated by the need to demonstrate 
its “civilized” status in the face of increasing infringement on Cherokee land, adopted a constitution in 
1827 that established a three-branch government, a bicameral legislature, and a bill of rights.26 Other 
tribes adopted constitutions to facilitate a legal claim against the federal government. For example, the 
Turtle Mountain Tribe’s Constitution was written in the twentieth century to advance its claim of 
restitution for an unconscionable nineteenth century treaty negotiation.27  
 
 Many tribes possessed constitutions prior to the IRA only to have the United States government 
abolish the tribal government altogether. For example, Congress’ 1906 Five Tribes Act effectively 
abolished the tribal courts and governments of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole 
tribes despite the existence of written constitutions.28 During the allotment era, the United States 
abolished the 1881 Osage Nation Tribal Constitution after the discovery of oil on Osage territory led the 
United States to assume jurisdiction over tribal membership and property.29 
 
  Thus, well before the IRA, many American Indian tribes and communities possessed documents 
or ideas achieving constitutional significance, sometimes, but not always, prompted by tribal interaction 
with the United States government. These pre-IRA examples demonstrate a clear link between the 
drafting of written constitutions and tribal attempts to establish legitimacy in the eyes of a federal 
government exercising increased authority over them. The drafting accelerated dramatically as the IRA 
shifted official federal policy from tribal assimilation to tribal self-governance. 
                                                
22 FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.05 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005); 
Rennard Strickland, Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings: Native American Law Before the Blue Coats, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1053–
54 (1997) (describing the oral constitutional tradition of Cheyenne, comprised of at least five varying stories exploring 
the origins of Cheyenne law and government, usually involving a woman who was creator and who passed down 
information about the uses of buffalo). 
23  CHARLES L. MEE JR., THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 237 (1987). Even if not true, Felix S. Cohen, a 
prominent influence on IRA tribal constitutions, believed that this influence of the Iroquois constitution on the U.S. 
Constitution was true. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 78. 
24 MEE, supra note 23, at 237. 
25 COHEN, supra note 22, § 4.05, at n.561; Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary 
Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 475 (2002) (noting that the Choctaw, originally based in the Mississippi River Valley, 
first wrote their Constitution in 1825). 
26 Eric Lemont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, 
28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (2003-04). 
27  See Keith Steven Richotte Jr., “We the Indians of the Turtle Mountain Reservation . . .”: Rethinking Tribal 
Constitutionalism Beyond the Colonialist/Revolutionary Dialectic (June 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota), available at http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/54709/1/RichotteJr_umn _0130E _10395. 
pdf. (examining episodes of constitutional history for the Turtle Mountain Indians). 
28  See Clarkson, supra note 25, at 478–79 (describing 1906 Five Tribes Act); Lemont, supra note 26, at 5 
(describing the deterioration of the Cherokee Nation’s tribal government despite its drafting of a second constitution in 
present-day Oklahoma shortly after its mid-nineteenth century removal from Georgia). 
29  HARV. PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., HONORING NATIONS: 2008 HONOREE 1, available at 
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Osage%20Nation%20Government%20Reform%20Initiative.pdf. 
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B. IRA Constitutions and the “End of Assimilation” 
 
 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 sought to encourage tribal self-governance and the 
reservation system.30 It established procedures and administrative infrastructure for approving tribal 
constitutions and taking land into trust on behalf of tribes.31 The IRA also officially declared the end of 
the federal government’s allotment policy, which had sought to assimilate Indians into American society 
by breaking up reservations into individual parcels, giving a 160-acre homestead to individual Indians, 
and selling “surplus” lands to non-Indians.32 Thus, the IRA reversed allotment policy, which envisioned 
the end of Indian tribes as separate sovereigns.33 Whether the IRA fostered a form of genuine self-
governance or merely continued to accomplish allotment’s assimilationist ends remains debated.34 
 
Unlike previous federal policies toward Indians, tribes had to “opt in” to be governed by the 
IRA, and referendums were held at reservations across the country. Ultimately, 181 tribes opted in, even 
though many of the approving tribes were brought under the fold through somewhat nefarious means.35 
However, the seventy-seven tribes that rejected the IRA—the largest being the Navajo Nation—still 
received federal recognition under a later Bureau of Indian Affairs provision that declared such tribes 
would be treated the same as the approving tribes,36 and could also adopt governing documents through 
procedures other than those set forth in the IRA.37 
 
 Under one of the IRA’s most far-reaching provisions, tribes had the option to adopt a 
constitution with assistance from the Department of the Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs (OIA), later 
renamed the Bureau of Indian Affairs.38 Tribes and the OIA reacted swiftly to this provision, with sixty-
five tribes establishing constitutions by 1937—less than three years after the passage of the Act—and 
ninety-three tribes doing so by 1945.39 
 
 The OIA worked closely with tribes during their constitutional drafting and ratification 
processes. Non-attorney field agents from the OIA Organization Division traveled to reservations to 
promote the adoption of written constitutions.40 Agents forwarded proposed draft constitutions to the 
OIA’s Washington D.C. office, where a small team of lawyers ensured the documents were “legally 
correct.”41 The OIA returned proposed changes to the Indians who had drafted the constitution, who 
                                                
30 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832 (1996). 
31 William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri 
“Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 579–83 (2009) (discussing IRA provisions 
providing a mechanism for the tribal acquisition of land).  
32 See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 68–69. 
33 Gould, supra note 30, at 832. 
34 Cf. Rusco, supra note 5, with THOMAS BIOLSI, ORGANIZING THE LAKOTA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
THE NEW DEAL ON THE PINE RIDGE AND ROSEBUD RESERVATIONS 85–108 (1992). 
35 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 110–11. A BIA legal opinion read the referendum requirement such that Indians 
not participating in the referendum—which was widespread given the lack of trust in the statute and federal government 
policy more generally—ultimately counted as votes in favor of IRA adoption rather than against; this was because the 
IRA required a majority of eligible voters to reject the document to avoid taking effect. Furthermore, BIA bureaucrats 
pressured tribes to adopt by withholding federal benefits or guidance on constitution drafting until the IRA referendum 
had been held. Id. 
36 Wilkins, supra note 17, at xxii. 
37 25 U.S.C. § 476(h)(1) (2006). 
38 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006). 
39 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 105–08. 
40 Rusco, supra note 5, at 64. 
41 Id. 
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either accepted or resisted the changes.42 One scholar assessed the OIA’s legal reviews as leaving a 
“substantial impact” on the content of the constitutions.43 Finally, approval, through both a tribal 
election and sign-off from the Secretary of the Interior, was required before the constitution would take 
effect.44  
 
A year after the passage of the IRA, the Organization Division set an ambitious goal of working 
with thirty tribes to achieve written constitutions within a year’s time.45 This frantic pace of constitution 
drafting, combined with the need for administrative approval incentivizing both field agents and tribes to 
prefer boilerplate provisions, resulted in a substantial number of tribal constitutions with identical or 
nearly identical clauses.46 The Department of the Interior also exerted its influence through a provision, 
included by many tribes at the OIA’s urging, requiring the Secretary of the Interior to approve any 
subsequent amendments to the constitution or ordinances passed pursuant to the new constitution.47 
 
C. Assessing IRA Constitutions 
 
 More than eighty years after the IRA’s passage, many tribal constitutions’ design failures have 
become evident. Many IRA constitutions are unable to adapt to rapid economic development, increasing 
on-reservation interactions with nonmembers, and the shifting set of a tribe’s limited powers. Most IRA 
tribal constitutions created a strong, unicameral legislative body—the tribal council—which integrated 
executive, legislative, and judicial functions, often in a small group of six members, without separation of 
powers.48 Because many tribal constitutions do not provide for an independent judiciary, councils have 
few limits on their authority. With all blame for tribal decisions or problems attributable to the council, 
elections frequently result in high rates of turnover, contributing to unstable government institutions, 
frequent allegations of corruption, and recurring constitutional crises.49  
 
 Moreover, IRA constitutions failed to engage with traditional tribal values, culture, and existing 
political institutions. By adopting a system of governance on the tribal level and using direct elections by 
tribal members to seat council members, vote on referenda, and approve constitutional amendments, 
IRA constitutions ignored tribal villages, clans, bands, families, and regions as units of governing 
bodies.50 Moreover, IRA constitutions’ use of majority voting models tended to displace consensus-
                                                
42 Id. at 64–65. 
43 Id. at 65. 
44 Id. 
45 Rusco, supra note 5, at 73. The pace of reforms was significantly attributable to internal pressures felt by the 
OIA, pressures the agency passed on to tribes. Because Congress had passed but not funded the IRA prior to a recess, 
the newly formed Organization Division launched an “Immediate Program” on July 31, 1934 to organize as many new 
tribal governments as possible in the five months prior to the next Congressional session beginning January 1935 to 
prove the project’s goals and capability. The Program identified thirty tribes as possible targets for immediate 
constitutional implementation and later whittled down the list to twelve. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 105–08. 
46 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 107. 
47 Resnik, supra note 5, at 712; Rusco, supra note 5, at 60. 
48 Champagne, supra note 19, at 20. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. For example, the creation of a Hopi Tribal Council jettisoned a system based on a collection of 
separate village governments—“each an elaborate, decentralized theocracy”—with authority affected by clan, village, 
Kikmongwi (the village religious leaders), and Masau’u, a mythical Hopi creation figure governing death. The Tribal 
Council was referred to as “the white man’s government,” and when religious leaders refused to certify council 
members, as required under the new constitution, the council eventually disbanded in 1943, seven years after its creation. 
Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458–59 (1996). 
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based models of traditional tribal governance.51 In addition, while codifying membership provisions, 
many constitutions exacerbated existing intratribal cultural, religious, or ethnic divisions. This resulted in 
the constitutions’ own eventual undoing when membership conflicts impacted the stability of tribal 
government or the original IRA constitution entirely.52 BIA pressure for the swift creation of an election 
apparatus to approve the IRA and then a constitution had the effect of delaying and short-changing 
debate among tribal members regarding membership criteria.53 
 
 Despite the frequently deleterious effects of IRA constitutions on tribal self-governance, 
scholars differ on the extent of the federal government’s role during the constitutional drafting and 
approval process, and the correlative legitimacy of IRA constitutions. Some view the constitutions as 
“largely imposed” by BIA officials, and membership-ratifying referenda as “structured with heavy Indian 
service influence—and without widespread community consensus or participation.”54 These scholars 
emphasize the federal influence on such constitutions: BIA agents charged with approving constitutional 
provisions sometimes threatened the existence of a tribe’s reservation land, federal recognition or 
funding if the tribe did not incorporate BIA suggestions.55 Other scholars note that the BIA circulated 
only excerpts of existing tribal constitutions, not a “model constitution,” that tribes often successfully 
resisted incorporating specific provisions requested by the BIA, and that tribal membership approval 
through referendums legitimated the constitutions.56 
 
 As Part III will demonstrate, both groups of scholars are correct: as dependent sovereigns, tribal 
constitution writing has inevitably occurred under the shadow of the federal government. The IRA-era 
influence on tribal constitution drafting is merely one instance of that structural arrangement. Today, 
congressional plenary power and BIA approval remain real constraints on the scope and mechanisms of 
tribal constitutional writing. Yet, as legitimate, albeit limited, sovereigns, tribal constitution writing plays a 










                                                
51 See, e.g., BIOLSI, supra note 34, at 34–45 (describing Lakota okaspé yamni, literally translated as three-fourths 
majority councils, based on a three-fourths approval requirement for any future Indian land sales originally included in 
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 but later adopted as the basis for future “traditional” governance, until these councils’ 
abrogation by the majority-rule tribal councils of the IRA era). 
52 For example, the Santa Clara Pueblo amended its 1935 constitution just four years after its creation to 
remove two specific paths to tribal membership: (1) children born to female members of the tribe and non-members 
and (2) persons naturalized into the tribe. Resnik, supra note 5, at 705. Given that children born to male tribal members 
and a non-member were accorded membership status, and that the tribe had never codified its membership rules in such 
a way before, this led to a later tribal dispute and eventually a failed Equal Protection claim under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, decided in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
53 Rusco, supra note 5, at 60. 
54 Champagne, supra note 19, at 19. 
55 MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 148–49 (2011) (describing BIA refusal to 
approve proposed Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians constitutional provision regarding 
membership and its threats to refuse to declare a reservation or even reconsider federal recognition of the Band entirely, 
among other steps). 
56 See, e.g., Rusco, supra note 5. 
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D. The Era of Self-Determination and Contemporary Constitutional Reforms 
 
The increasingly apparent shortcomings of IRA constitutions—often culminating in the 
formation of dual governments or constitutional standoffs among competing branches of tribal 
governments57—have coincided with the exercise of increased powers of self-governance. 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, a number of federal statutes ushered in a new era of tribal sovereignty: 
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 197558 allowed the federal government 
to enter contracts directly with a tribe rather than through the BIA; the Indian Child Welfare Act of 
197859 recognized tribal courts as the proper forum for child welfare and custody cases involving Native 
American children; and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 fostered authority to develop casinos 
for the economic benefit of the tribe and its members.60  
 
Although the powers of Indian tribes remain sharply delimited by their dependent sovereign 
status, self-government remains the greatest power that contemporary tribes possess and need to 
enunciate in their constitutions.60 This power includes the ability to form a government, define 
membership criteria, regulate members’ domestic relations, prescribe rules of inheritance, levy dues, fees 
and taxes upon tribal members and nonmembers conducting on-reservation business, exclude 
nonmembers from the reservation, regulate tribal property, and establish a justice system to resolve most 
offenses and disputes between tribal members.61 
 
 With tribes exercising expanded authority, constitutional reform to manage these increased 
powers has become commonplace. Today, dozens of tribes are engaged in the processes of 
constitutional reform,62 either proposing significant amendments or adopting new constitutions 
wholesale. Although each tribe must tailor its rewriting to its unique history, values and culture,63 many 
tribal constitutions’ common IRA heritage translates into shared reform obstacles and goals today. 
Confronting political instability, institutional incapacity, and governance mechanisms that fail to reflect a 
unique cultural heritage remain at the center of many tribes’ agendas, often through designing a system 
with a division of branches, a strong executive, and an independent judiciary. Some commentators have 
compared tribes’ current need to create a strong centralized authority capable of managing complex 
                                                
57  EXEC. SESSION ON AM. INDIAN CONST. REFORM, REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES IN DEVELOPING 
EXECUTIVE PROCESSES OF AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2002), available at 
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/May%20Summary%20Report.pdf [hereinafter EXEC. SESSION]. Many 
recent tribal constitutional crises have involved a tribe’s disenrollment of often long-standing members. See, e.g., Carmen 
George, Chukchansi Tribal Council Seats Still Vacant, SIERRA STAR (Mar. 29, 2012, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.sierrastar.com/2012/03/29/57761/chukchansi.html (describing standoff between four newly elected tribal 
council members against recent disenrollments and existing tribal council that refused to recognize the new members). 
58 Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458bbb-2 (2006)). 
59 Pub. L. No. 95-608, 93 Stat. 3071 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006)). 
60 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–64 (1981) (noting tribes’ dependent status is inconsistent 
with control of external relations, but that “the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce 
criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers 
as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)). 
The court went on to define internal relations as the “power to punish tribal offenders, . . . determine tribal membership, 
to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.” Id. 
61  Eric D. Lemont, Introduction to AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF 
NATIVE NATIONS 2 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
62 Id. at 3; EXEC. SESSION, supra note 57. 
63.Joseph Kalt, Constitutional Rule and the Effective Governance of Native Nations, in AMERICAN INDIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 184, 186 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006); Lemont, 
supra note 61, at 12. 
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twenty-first century dynamics to the U.S. founders’ need to rewrite the weak and ineffective Articles of 
Confederation.64 
 
 Because tribes do not institute constitutional reforms on a blank slate, however, tribes also 
confront questions about the mechanisms through which reform can be achieved, as well as the design 
of effective mechanisms for future constitutional change. Tribes still draft constitutions alongside a BIA 
handbook that includes proposed provisions, format and content, and the BIA offers both informal and 
formal review processes throughout the drafting process.65 Despite this, many tribes have engaged in 
reform processes that depart substantially from IRA and BIA boilerplate provisions, reflecting a broader 
renewal of contemporary self-governance.66 At the same time, amendment and reform occurs against the 
backdrop of the constitutions’ subnational status, attempting to govern a discrete population while 
dependent upon and responsive to a broader national government. These process questions—about the 
structural possibilities and limitations on tribal constitutional amendment and reform—will form the 
focus of the remainder of the paper. 
 
III. APPROACHING TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONAL REWRITING: AMENDMENT AND 
REFORM 
 
“[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. 
They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their own 
persons, and consequently may govern them as they please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects of 
government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors extinguished them, in their natural course, with those whose 
will gave them being. This could preserve that being till it ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution, then, and 
every law, naturally expires at the end of nineteen years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.” 
—Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, September 6, 1789 67 
 
“Look and listen for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming 
generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground—the unborn of the future Nation.” 
—Great Law of the Iroquois68 
                                                
64 Champagne, supra note 19, at 16. 
65 Resnik, supra note 5, at 714. 
66 The White Earth Nation constitutional reform process, which won membership approval in a November 
2013 tribal referendum, offers a leading example of the dynamic and wholesale reform processes tribes are currently 
undertaking. The new constitution replaces an existing IRA-era constitution “that was forced on us by the U.S. 
government.” Terry Janis & Jill Doerfler, Educational Team Will Visit Communities, Host Seminar, White Earth Nation, 
http://www.whiteearth.com/programs/?page_id=515&program_id=24 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). The tribe enlisted 
White Earth member and noted literary author and scholar Gerald Vizenor as lead writer for the proposed constitution, 
which engaged with indigenous literary traditions. Between 2007 and 2009, White Earth convened four constitutional 
conventions, where appointed delegates and interested tribal members discussed important tribal values, including 
respect, love, family and tolerance, and how those values could be used to “heal our nation.” Prior to the referendum, 
the Nation published summaries and explanations of the proposed changes in a tribal newspaper and on Facebook, 
hosted community education forums on- and off-reservation, and a day-long Constitution Seminar. See id.; Jill Doerfler, 
White Earth Reconvenes Constitutional Convention, ANISHINAABEG TODAY, Jan. 16, 2008, at 1; Lisa Brooks, The 
Constitution of the White Earth Nation: A New Innovation in a Longstanding Indigenous Literary Tradition, Stud. in Am. Indian 
Literatures, no. 4, Winter 2011, at 48. See generally JILL DOERFLER & GERALD VIZENOR, THE WHITE EARTH NATION: 
RATIFICATION OF A NATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2012). 
67  JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS, CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (Joyce 
Appleby and Terence Ball eds., 1999). 
68 The Constitution of the Iroquois Nations: The Great Binding Law, Indigenous People, 
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/iroqcon.htm (last updated Mar. 30, 2012). 
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 This Part considers the scope and frequency of constitutional change as related to a 
constitution’s location within a subnational structure and an important avenue for examining 
constitutional meaning. This Part contends that tribal constitutions have undergone the most frequent 
wholesale constitutional reform within the American constitutional structure. This fact is both a product 
of their subnational status and a reflection of tribal values and approaches to governance.  
 
Subnational constitutionalism can be understood as a “two-tiered constitutional structure that 
establishes a superior state and a group of subordinate states that exercise overlapping control of a single 
population,” with both the superior state and the subordinate states having their own constitutions.69 
The subnational framework situates tribal constitutions within a dialogue between sovereign tribal 
nations and the federal system that has cast a long shadow over tribal self-governance. In doing so, this 
framework recognizes tribal constitutions, alongside the federal and state constitutions, as 
“interdependent features of a greater American constitutional structure,” with each “dependent upon, 
limited by, and to some extent the product of . . . our national constitutional environment.”70 
 
 At any level of the national constitutional structure, the scope of constitutional change can be 
categorized into two basic approaches: amendment or reform. Amendment, or “ordinary constitutional 
reform,” involves small-scale adjustments designed to tackle specific problems, adding onto, and thereby 
preserving, existing governance documents.71 Reform, on the other hand, involves a “more fundamental 
reconsideration of constitutional foundations. It introduces changes of considerable breadth and impact, 
changes that substantially affect the operation of [the] government or . . . public policy.”72 
 
 A brief comparative analysis of constitutional change73 reveals that tribes are the only force in 
the American constitutional structure still engaged in frequent reform. The United States Constitution 
has not experienced reform for well over 200 years.74 Although new American state constitutions and 
constitutional conventions were commonplace in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century 
witnessed far fewer of both: only twenty-three new constitutions compared to ninety-four in the 
previous century.75 Since 1984, that pace has ground to a halt—there has been only one new state 
                                                
69 Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (2010). The subnational 
analogy is an imperfect one. See G. ALAN TARR, FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE 
PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2001), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/ 
publications/aver2.pdf (asserting that tribes are not component units in the U.S. federal system but rather “semi-
autonomous entities”). However, as “domestic dependent nations” subject to Congressional plenary power, tribal 
sovereignty is clearly limited and structured by the federal superstate. Id. 
70 Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1803, 1805 (1992) (emphasis in 
original). 
71 G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 2 (G. Alan Tarr 
& Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). 
72 Id. 
73 Scholarship on U.S. federal and state constitutions is deployed not as a substantive model for tribes existing 
in very different political, historical and geographic circumstances, but rather for comparative insight into the 
constitutional amendment and reform processes relevant to the current wave of tribal constitutional redrafting. 
Although acknowledging the important role of informal constitutional change, at least at the federal level—see, e.g., 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 113–14 (1991) (discussing the New Deal Supreme Court’s 
substantial interpretive rewriting of the Constitution)—this paper will confine itself to a comparison of formal 
constitutional change, although the Part on reform raises questions that involve interplay between the formal and the 
informal. 
74  This statement considers only formal constitutional reform. Informal, non-textual constitutional reform 
arguably occurred during the Civil War/Reconstruction and New Deal eras. Even still, federal constitutional reform 
remains far more infrequent than state and tribal iterations. 
75 Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1517, 1520 (2009). 
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constitution and no constitutional conventions.76 Although statistics regarding tribal constitutions are 
difficult to compile, it is clear that dozens of tribes have adopted new constitutions or engaged in 
wholesale constitutional reform processes within the last twenty years.77 
 
 In addition to the scope of constitutional change, the frequency of change also affects the 
interpretation and role of the founding document. The federal constitution’s relative durability and 
unchanging nature fosters mystique as compared to state constitutions’ frequent changes and detailed 
“constitutional legislation” provisions that are more on par with ordinary statutes.78 Durable 
constitutions serving as the supreme law prevent temporary majorities from passing amendments that 
harm fundamental governing principles and also allow citizens to rely on a consistent form of 
government.79 On the other hand, malleable constitutions more easily accommodate significant societal 
changes, including changes to population, economy, threats to sovereignty, and so forth.80 Thus 
Jefferson’s suggestion in a letter to Madison, quoted above, that constitutional provisions should sunset 
every nineteen years to allow a new generation of citizens to design a constitution appropriate to their 
contemporary context. 
 
 The pace of change to tribal constitutions more closely parallels that of state constitutions than 
that of the federal constitution and is consistent with the theory of subnational constitutions more 
generally.81 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United States Constitution has been amended 
less than once per decade, and the original document still governs.82 In contrast, only nineteen states still 
retain their original constitution, the majority of states have had three or more different constitutions, 
and Louisiana and Georgia have had eleven and ten iterations.83 On average, state constitutions have 120 
amendments.84 Although the history of tribal constitutions is uneven, the Cherokee, for example, have 
had four different constitutions, and most tribes engaging in contemporary reform are adopting either 
their second or third constitution within the last seventy-five years.85 
 
 Thus, tribal constitutional change occurs at both greater scope and frequency compared to the 
federal or state models. The federal model has tended to avoid formal reform in favor of informal 
constitutional changes outside the document as well as the occasional amendment, while states have 
                                                
76 Id. 
77 Recent examples of tribes undertaking wholesale constitutional reform include the Chickasaw (1990), Pala 
Band of Mission Indians (1997), Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma (1999), Crow (2001), Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa (2001), Cherokee (2003), Osage (2006), Citizen Potawatomi Nation (2007), Ho-Chunk Nation (2007), White 
Earth Nation (2007), Gila River Indian Community (2009), and Eastern Band of Cherokee (2011). 
78  Ginsburg and Posner posit that subnational constitutions’ systematic disposition in favor of constitutional 
reform and amendment suggest that subconstitutions are closer to ordinary statutes than are superstate constitutions.  
Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 69, at 1600–01. 
79 Cain & Noll, supra note 75, at 1517–18. 
80 Id. at 1518. 
81  See, e.g., Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 69, at 1599-1601 (proposing that subconstitutions weaken their 
amendment procedures because separation of powers and rights are guaranteed at the federal level and reporting that no 
subconstitutional system is more difficult to amend than the constitution of its super-state). 
82 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 (1998). 
83 Id. at 22, 24. 
84 Id. at 24. 
85 See, e.g., D. Jay Hannah, The 1999 Constitution Convention of the Cherokee Nation, 35 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 3–6 (2003) 
(describing constitutions drafted by the Cherokees in 1827, 1839, 1976, and 1999); David J. Carlson, Trickster Hermeneutics 
and the Postindian Reader: Gerald Vizenor’s Constitutional Praxis, STUD. IN AM. INDIAN LITERATURES, Winter 2011, at 13, 26 
(comparing new Constitution of the White Earth Nation with earlier IRA-era Revised Constitution and Bylaws of the 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe); Clarkson, supra note 25, at 487 n.87 (describing the approval of Choctaw’s 1983 
Constitution, its third following a 1979 Constitution and its original 1860 Constitution, after a 1976 district court 
decision affirmed the continuing validity of the first Constitution, permitting renewed self-government). 
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eschewed large-scale reform in favor of specific constitutional amendments. Clearly, tribal constitutions’ 
subnational status impacts this tendency: major rights of tribal members are guaranteed by federal 
statutes; the limited powers of tribal governance tend to make tribal constitutions resemble ordinary 
legislation, filling in the details where larger structural issues are determined elsewhere; and tribes must 
navigate the formal (IRA) and informal (lure of benefits, need for legitimacy, advantages of organized 




“[T]o me it seems not very important exactly what constitution you adopt to begin with because you can always improve it. 
You can improve it twice a year if you want to. The thing to do is to get organized.” 
— John Collier, Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (1933-45), urging passage of the Oglala Sioux 
Constitution despite opposition to its substance86 
 
1. Ease of Amendment 
 
 Many tribal constitutions specify relatively easy amendment procedures, commonly featuring a 
majority approval requirement and multiple routes to propose an amendment, including voter 
initiatives.87 This ease is consistent with the BIA’s standard amendment provision, subnational 
constitutional theory, and historical accident from the era of IRA constitution drafting. 
   
The BIA’s current standard amendment provision88 recommends: 
• An amendment proposed by a majority of Tribal Council members or through a petition signed 
by at least 30% of qualified voters89 
• A majority vote of qualified voters at a special election called by the Secretary of the Interior90 
                                                
86  BIOLSI, supra note 34, at 96. 
87  See, e.g., ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE CONST. art. IX, § 1 (majority approval requirement for qualified voters to 
approve amendment); id. § 2 (providing that petition signed by 30% of voters in the last election results in Tribal 
Constitution Convention to consider amendments); MOHEGAN TRIBE CONST. art. XVII (providing for majority vote 
requirement to amend constitution so long as 30% of registered voters participate); id. art. X, § 2 (k) & (l) (empowering 
Council of Elders to recommend and place constitutional amendments to vote); id. art. XII, § 2 (creating petition 
procedure for 40% of registered voters to propose amendments). 
88  BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, SAMPLE CONSTITUTION OF THE EXAMPLE TRIBE, available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001884.pdf. 
89  Variations include CAMP MCDOWELL INDIANS OF ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Amendment proposal by 2/3 
of qualified Indian voters on reservation or unanimous vote of five-member council); CHICKASAW NATION CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 1 (initiative requires 20% of voter support); BLACKFEET TRIBE CONST. art. X (amendment proposal requires 
2/3 of council or 1/3 of qualified voters); CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLA. CONST. art. XIII (no provision for 
voter initiative, only the tribal council may propose amendments); S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE CONST. art. XII, § 1 (initiative 
requires only 20% of voters); CHOCTAW NATION CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (requiring votes of eight of twelve tribal council 
members to propose amendments). 
90  Variations include CHOCTAW NATION CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (requiring 51% approval of total number of 
qualified voters at last election and no separate minimum participation requirement); NEZ PERCE TRIBE CONST. art. IX, 
§ 1 (requiring 2/3 approval at referendum); White Earth Nation Constitution, ch. 20 (requiring 2/3 of recorded eligible 
votes in an election or referendum to amend Constitution), available at http://www.whiteearth.com/data/upfiles/files/ 
Proposed_White_Earth_constitution_2.pdf. A number of pre-IRA constitutions provided an amendment approval 
procedure through regular meetings of legislative bodies. A pre-IRA Constitution of the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians did not submit constitutional amendments for direct vote; instead, they could be proposed and 
approved at any regular meeting of the advisory committee or tribal council. TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS CONST. OF 1932 art. VI, § 1. Similarly, the Oglala Sioux Tribe empowered the tribal council of forty delegates 
to amend the Constitution by a majority vote at any regular council meeting so long as the proposed amendment was 
filed with thirty days notice. OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE CONST. OF 1933 art. VIII. 
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• Participation of at least 30% of eligible voters in the special election91 
• Approval by the Secretary of the Interior 
 
The core of these provisions—allowing proposals through majority legislative agreement or popular 
initiative and majority approval through referendums—place the constitutional amendment process of 
most tribes much closer to state constitutional models than the federal constitution.92 If tribal 
constitutions experienced a correlation between the flexibility and frequency of amendments93—i.e. 
tribal constitutions are amended frequently because it is relatively easy to do so—amendments to tribal 
constitutions would be substantial. The ease of state constitutional amendment has resulted in the 
average state constitution featuring 120 amendments.94 
 
Tribes’ constitutional requirements for amendment resemble ordinary legislation more than 
either the federal or state constitutional models. Many tribes require only a majority of tribal council 
members to propose an amendment—no different than the consensus required for passage of a tribal 
council ordinance.95 Most states (twenty-seven) impose a supermajority requirement on their state 
legislatures for amendment proposals.96 This tribal constitutional proximity to ordinary legislation 
remains consistent with a theory of dependent sovereignty where the superstate’s constitutional or 
plenary authority over the subconstitution limits the latter’s incentives to protect rights, resulting in 
lowered amendment requirements.97 
 
Both tribal constitutions and state constitutions heavily employ direct participation as a 
mechanism to initiate and approve constitutional amendments, increasing the ease of amendment not 
                                                
91  Not all tribes impose a minimum participation requirement or one counted by percentage. See, e.g., 
CHEROKEE CONST. art. XV, § 2 (amendment valid as long as simple majority met); NEZ PERCE TRIBE CONST. art IX, 
§ 1 (requiring not less than 100 votes cast out of a tribal population of 2,700). 
92 Of course, the federal Article V amendment process does not involve the direct participation of voters in 
either the proposal or approval process, leaving either Congress or state legislatures to propose an amendment and state 
legislatures or state conventions to approve them. Moreover, Article V requires the consent of either 2/3 of both the 
House and the Senate or 2/3 of state legislatures just to propose an amendment; an extraordinary 3/4 of the state bodies 
must consent to approve one. No other provision in the United States Constitution imposes such a high requirement for 
consent, even though the Constitution significantly lowered the consent requirement from the unanimity that the 
Articles of Confederation required, ultimately leading to its downfall. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 285–86 (2005). 
93 TARR, supra note 82, at 141 n.22. 
94 Id. at 10, 24. 
95  See, e.g., CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLA. CONST. art. XIII(1)(a) (permitting Legislature to amend 
Constitution by “calling a Special Election by law”); id. art. VI(7)(a)(iii) (“All decisions of the Legislature shall be made by 
a majority vote of the Legislators present unless otherwise specified in this Constitution”); S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE CONST. 
art. XII, § 1 (providing election for constitutional amendment with votes of four of seven tribal council members); 
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS CONST. art. XV, § 2 (requiring election for constitutional 
amendment upon request of Tribal Council, with Tribal Council action requiring only majority vote). 
96 Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of 
State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1641 (2010). Most states imposing a supermajority requirement for 
legislative amendment proposal follow the U.S. Constitution’s 2/3 model (eighteen states), followed by nine states 
requiring 3/5 approval and four states involving hybrid schemes with both supermajority and majority requirements.  
On the other hand, most tribal constitutions’ initiative requirement of 20-33% of eligible voters remains substantially 
higher than most states, where 8-10% is more common. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8b (8% initiative requirement); 
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 21(c) (8% initiative requirement); NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2, cl. 2 (10% initiative requirement). 
97 See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 69, at 1608 (predicting that federal government monitoring of states has 
reduced since incorporation of the Bill of Rights, leading to an increase in state constitutional amendments enacted by 
interest groups). Of course, Indian tribes have not experienced incorporation. Empirical studies on the links between 
laws such as the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (guaranteeing most constitutional rights to the tribes, although largely 
enforced by tribal rather than federal courts) and tribal constitutional reform are necessary. 
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only because of the availability of a second path for amendment outside of action by elected officials but 
also because of the pressure exerted on the legislative body to initiate change itself.98 The use of direct 
participation might result from a historical accident: states widely transformed their constitutions during 
the Progressive era, where direct democracy measures and the push for economic, political and social 
reform through constitutional amendments became commonplace.99 IRA constitutions were drafted 
shortly after this period. Consider that three consecutive amendments to the United States Constitution 
at the end of the Progressive era all incorporated direct voter election: Amendment XVII’s Direct Senate 
Election Amendment (1913),100 Prohibition Amendment XVIII’s requirement of re-ratification within 
seven years (1919),101 and Amendment XIX’s extension of suffrage to women (1920).102 
 
Tribal constitutions share with state constitutions the broad use of voter initiative and 
referendum mechanisms. Twenty states amended their constitutions between 1898 and 1918 to provide 
for voter initiatives that propose constitutional amendments.103 Even prior to constitutional proposals by 
initiative, state constitutional amendments were widely approved by referendum since the early 
nineteenth century, and popular approval became the rule by the 1830’s.104 Today, all states except 
Delaware continue this practice.105 Like the dominant tribal model, forty-four states require only a simple 
majority of referendum voters for approval.106 
 
2. Administrative Approval 
 
Despite the similarity in the procedures of amendment that would seem to suggest frequent and 
numerous constitutional amendments, many tribal constitutions face an additional level of approval 
making them markedly different from state constitutions.107 Approval by the Secretary of the Interior 
currently serves as a major impediment to tribal self-determination.108 The element of federal 
administrative approval suggests that, within the American constitutional structure, tribal constitutions 
experience the most limitations on sovereign constitutional development and reflect deep 
interdependence with the super-state. 
 
                                                
98 WALTER DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 292 (1910) (“Perhaps the 
greatest value which the initiative will have is not in the direct results which may come from its use, but in its influence 
in causing legislatures to act upon matters upon which action is desired by the people.”). 
99 Devins, supra note 96, at 1643. 
100  Interestingly, the origins of the federal Direct Senate Election Amendment were decidedly western, based 
largely on the state of Oregon’s plan to allow voters in the general election to express their preference for the United 
States Senator of their choice and allowing state legislators first to pledge to support the direct result, and later requiring 
them to do so through a 1908 state initiative. See AMAR, supra note 92, at 411.  
101  See id. at 417–19 (noting Amendment XVIII, section 3’s definition of “operative” laid the groundwork for a 
potential future move towards a more directly democratic system of amendment). 
102  See id. at 419 (noting this amendment constituted the “single biggest democratic event in American history” 
in sheer numbers). 
103  Devins, supra note 96, at 1643.  
104  DODD, supra note 98, at 64–65. 
105  TARR, supra note 82, at 26. 
106  Id. at 34. 
107  The exception would be federal checks on state constitutions upon statehood and federal constitutional 
review of state constitutional amendments under the 14th Amendment. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, 
Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (2004) (tracking the federal 
government’s influence on state constitutions as states rejoined the Union after the Civil War). 
108  See, e.g., Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 KAN. L. REV. 
437, 448 (2002) (discussing BIA refusal to sponsor an election for the proposed constitutional amendment of the Lac 
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians that would have altered membership requirements from a 
blood quantum requirement to ancestry). 
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Although the Secretary must call a special election for tribal members when the constitutional 
requirements for proposing an amendment are met,109 he may reject any amendment “contrary to 
applicable law.”110 The Bureau of Indian Affairs has also reserved the right to reject amendment 
provisions that are “inappropriate,” including those that do not conform to Bureau policies.111  
Moreover, in the case of conflicting amendment proposals, the Secretary must call an election for the 
proposal “first received by the officer in charge” if it is found “valid.”112 Thus, the Secretary retains 
discretion to reject amendments based on an undefined declaration of “validity,” and acts as referee 
when tribal governance disputes yield conflicting constitutional change. The Secretary also retains 
discretion when tribal procedures do not offer a clear resolution. For example, if the amendment 
provisions of a tribal constitution become “outdated” such that “amendment cannot be effected 
pursuant to them,” the Secretary “may” nonetheless authorize an election at the request of the tribal 
government.113 
 
a. Case Study: Secretarial Approval and the 2003 Cherokee 
Constitution 
 
 The 1999-2003 Cherokee constitutional reform process illustrates the deep subconstitutional 
status of tribes with a Secretarial approval requirement: the requirement served as both a desirable 
mechanism to enable self-governance and a hindrance to sovereign constitutionalism. The 1975 
Cherokee Nation Constitution—the first since the federal government disallowed Cherokee self-
governance in 1907—voluntarily included a provision requiring federal approval for future constitutional 
changes. The Cherokee constitutional drafters believed the approval provision would facilitate the 
limited sovereignty it possessed by obtaining further government support; constitutional reformers were 
motivated by the possibility of federal funding,114 and thus they designed substantive provisions, such as 
a unicameral legislature and internal judiciary, to ensure quick receipt and disbursement of federal funds 
and to improve the delivery of services to individual tribal members.115 
 
 When the Cherokee voters approved a new constitution in 1999, the amendment provision 
ultimately delayed the implementation of the new Constitution, and the federal government has not yet 
recognized the new Constitution.116 After the BIA expressed disapproval with several provisions of the 
new constitution and mandated specific changes, the Cherokee Nation instead submitted a constitutional 
                                                
109 25 C.F.R. § 81.5(d) (2011) (“The Secretary shall authorize the calling of an election on the adoption of 
amendments to a constitution and bylaws or a charter when requested pursuant to the amendment article of those 
documents.”). 
110 Congress, in 1988 amendments to the IRA, limited the Secretary’s discretion during the approval process by 
(1) setting a forty-five-day time limit for secretarial authorization for a constitutional referendum or for approval of a 
ratified amendment and (2) limiting the Secretary’s discretion by mandating approval of an amendment unless “contrary 
to applicable laws.” See FLETCHER, supra note 55, at 155. However, this provision restores the centrality of federal 
government action—treaties, executive orders, acts of Congress or court decisions—to limit the ability of tribes to 
amend their constitutions. 
111 KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP 
119-120 (Oxford Univ. Press 1st ed. 2011). 
112 25 C.F.R. § 81.5(g) (2011).  
113 25 C.F.R. § 81.5(e) (2011). 
114 Lemont, supra note 26, at 7 n.14 (“[Cherokee Leader Ross] Swimmer said that in Eastern Oklahoma: A lot 
of federal help was being given to tribes in the west, but none in Oklahoma, because again we didn’t have organized 
tribes. This was also an impetus, a big impetus, for the adoption of a constitution . . . . I saw this opportunity with the 
federal money that was coming in that we could use that and turn it into a useful tool that we could do some things in 
Eastern Oklahoma.”) 
115 Id. at 9. 
116 Id. at 32. 
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amendment to the voters removing the Secretarial approval provision of the 1975 Constitution, which 
the voters approved.117 Despite continued BIA opposition to the measure, in 2006 the Cherokee Nation 
Supreme Court affirmed that voters had validly removed the approval provision and declared the 2003 
constitution in full force.118 Although an administration change resulted in later secretarial approval of 
the amendment, a 2011 BIA opinion declared that the approval was not “retroactive,” and thus the new 
constitution was not valid since voter ratification preceded the constitutional amendment.119 
 
 Presumably, the Cherokee could have merely re-submitted the constitution to its voters for re-
ratification. But when the ratification issue became intertwined with federal disagreement about a 
separate constitutional amendment disenrolling Cherokee Freedmen, and the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development suspended $33 million in Cherokee Nation funds, the Cherokee 
settled outside of the constitutional framework.120 Perhaps more than the secretarial approval provision, 
the Nation’s annual receipt of $500 million in federal funding serves to limit the Cherokee’s ability to 
fully amend its constitution as it, for better or worse, sees fit.121 
 
 However, like the Cherokee, a number of tribes have amended their constitutions to remove 
BIA approval power, which the BIA has tended to accept.122 Although federal legislation delegating 
power to the Secretary to adopt and approve tribal constitutions provides that tribes may adopt 
amendments through any other method pursuant to their inherent sovereign authority,123 such 
constitutions will not be “recognized” by the BIA. This raises the possibility of increased BIA opposition 
to tribal government actions, issues arising during the distribution of federal benefits, and the inability to 
claim federal preemption against state intrusion into tribal governments.124  
 
b. Subnational Similarities: Federal Approval of State Constitutions 
 
Secretarial approval of tribal constitutions is similar to the requirement of initial Congressional 
approval of state constitutions, reflecting a broader characteristic of subnational constitutionalism. As 
such, infringement on tribal sovereignty to rewrite their constitutions reflects not just the continuation of 
a tribe’s domestic dependent status, but rather a practice shared by constitutional governments operating 
within federal schemes, including states, territories, and tribes. For example, prior to state admission, 
Congress and the President review constitutional provisions and can refuse to admit the state until 
desired constitutional changes are made.125 Awareness of this requirement tends to deter states from 
drafting constitutional provisions likely to upset federal power.126 Unlike tribes, federal restrictions are 
                                                
117  Id. at 31. 
118 In re Status and Implementation of the 1999 Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the 
Cherokee Nation (June 7, 2006), available at http://www.cornsilks.com/99con.pdf. 
119 Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs (September 9, 
2011), available at http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/0/Documents/2011/9/32697Cherokee_9_9_11_(3).pdf. 
120 Steve Olafson, Cherokee Tribe Retreats from Effort to Oust Some Members, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usa-cherokees-idUSTRE78E5IX20110915. 
121.Cherokee Nation Chief Mindful of Funding in Freedmen Dispute, INDIANZ.COM (Nov. 8, 2011),  
http://www.indianz.com/News/2011/003661.asp (quoting the Cherokee Nation chief’s resolve to defend the $500 
million in federal funding received annually by the Nation that had been threatened by the Obama administration during 
the Freedmen dispute). 
122 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 
65 (1995). 
123 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2011). 
124 Resnik, supra note 5, at 713 n.189. 
125 TARR, supra note 82, at 40. 
126 Id. 
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removed upon statehood, and states have historically incorporated previously offending provisions after 
receiving such status.127  
 
More dramatic federal restrictions on subnational constitution reform have occurred during 
extraordinary historical moments; for example, during Reconstruction, one commentator (correctly) 
predicted that newly adopted Southern state constitutions would “last just as long as the bayonets which 
ushered them into being, shall keep them in existence, and not one day longer.”128 At times, federal 
restrictions on tribes have gone further, abolishing tribal self-governance altogether.129 Currently, 
however, tribal authority to remove the BIA approval provisions—even if informal pressures 
accompanying federal supervision counsel against doing so—renders tribal constitutions more sovereign 
than their subnational counterparts in South Africa, where provincial constitutions cannot take effect 
until judicial review for compliance with thirty-four principles enunciated in the federal constitution.130 
In short, both the ease of and restrictions on tribal constitutional amendment situate tribes within a 





 Beyond the relatively easy amendment procedures and Secretarial approval requirement, tribes 
seeking constitutional change face the limiting nature of an outdated original framework. Whether an 
existing IRA-era constitution is considered imposed by outsiders or unfit for the times, tribes have often 
foregone amendments to existing constitutions in favor of wholesale reform. Amendments are typically 
appropriate for correcting “specific problems” in documents, but are unlikely to consider questions of 
broader constitutional design.131 Moreover, because the specific nature of amendments compounds the 
specific nature of tribal constitutions, frequent amendment creates “a language and provision multiplier 
effect.”132 For example, prior to constitutional reform on the Turtle Mountain Reservation, tribal 
members viewed the frequency of constitutional amendment as reflecting a valuable commitment to 
constitutionalism but leaving a “patchwork quilt” indicating that constitutional reform, not merely 
amendment, was necessary.133 
 
 Of course, the federal Constitution’s patchwork nature has not necessarily been viewed as 
problematic. For example, Akhil Reed Amar has discussed the benefits of the document’s reflection of 
national historical developments over more than two hundred years.134 Moreover, states used to engage 
in frequent wholesale constitutional reform, but recently amendments have become a more 
commonplace method for state reformers, leaving tribes as the units most frequently engaged in 
subnational constitutional reform in the United States.135 
 
                                                
127  Id. at 41. 
128  Id. at 131. 
129  See supra note 28. 
130  See supra text accompanying note 16. 
131  Tarr, supra note 71, at 6. 
132  Cain & Noll, supra note 75, at 1520 (discussing in state constitution context). 
133  See Richotte, supra note 27 (noting members’ view on the tribe’s nine different amendments since 1959). 
134  AMAR, supra note 92, at 458–63 (noting the chronological order of Amendment text “has happily 
encouraged the Constitution’s readers to attend to the document’s history and trend line . . . . [Without chronological 
ordering], this strong vector [towards increasing democracy] would have been less visible.”). 
135  Devins, supra note 96, at 1640–41 (“[T]he principal mechanism by which states now update their 
constitutions is the amendment process . . . .”). 
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Tribes often do not know the path to constitutional change prior to the start of the reform 
process. When the Cherokee Nation began constitutional reform in 1999, neither the authorizing tribal 
council nor the independent Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission had imagined the end product. 
Some reformers envisioned a series of amendments to the existing 1975 Constitution, as the idea of 
wholesale reform sparked significant opposition.136 However, following a series of twenty public 
hearings, reformers recognized that the breadth and quantity of desired change could not be achieved in 
a series of amendments. The Nation’s General Counsel worried that a new constitution would create a 
“big target” for those opposed to reform, and a Cherokee Supreme Court Justice expressed concern 
about the loss of precedential value from case law based on the old constitution.137 Nonetheless, the 
Commission chose to draft a new constitution using public comments from the hearings as a starting 
point.138 
  
1. Understanding the Challenges of Reform: The Cherokee Constitutional 
Convention and Reform Process of 1999-2003 
 
The Cherokee Constitutional Convention and Reform Process of 1999-2003 provides a useful 
opportunity for understanding the processes and challenges of wholesale constitutional reform among 
American Indian tribes, both because it has been extensively documented139 and because it reflects the 
limitations under which tribal constitution reform can take place. As discussed above, despite the 
Cherokee members’ ratification of the new constitution in 2003, the federal government has yet to 
recognize it and insists the Cherokee are operating under the previous 1975 constitution.140 As such, the 
reform process highlights tribal constitutions’ interdependent status with the federal system, even as 
tribes discard IRA-era constitutions due to the taint of federal authorship and control.141 
 
 Tribal constitutional reform tends to operate outside of any pre-existing framework. Although 
most tribal constitutions contain provisions for amendment similar to the BIA model, few contain 
detailed provisions for wholesale constitutional reform.142 Some discuss the procedure for calling a 
constitutional convention, although procedures for selecting delegates, operating the convention, or 
ratifying the resulting document are rarely defined.143  
 
Nonetheless, common issues facing tribal reformers have been identified, including the role of 
existing tribal government officials in the reform process, the scale of reform, and the tendency for 
contentious issues—especially blood quantum and membership requirements—to derail reform projects. 
                                                
136  Lemont, supra note 26, at 29. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. at 16. 
139  Archives from the Cherokee Nation Constitutional Commission are available at, http://www.cherokee.org 
/OurGovernment/Commissions/ConstitutionConvention.aspx. 
140  See Bureau of Indian Affairs, supra note 119. 
141  Devins, supra note 96, at 1640–41 (noting that only Georgia has adopted a new constitution in last 30 years 
and that two-thirds of states have constitutions that are more than 100 years old); Cain & Noll, supra note 75, at 1520 
(noting the continued high pace of state constitutional amendments compared to the decline of state constitutional 
conventions and new constitutions). 
142  Champagne, supra note 19, at 30–31; Steven Haberfeld, The Process of Constitutional Reform, in AMERICAN 
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 252, 253 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
143  See, e.g., ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE CONST. art. IX, § 2 (providing that petition signed by 30% of voters in the 
last election results in the Tribal Constitution Convention to consider amendments, conducted by a seven-person Tribal 
Constitutional Task Force consisting of tribal members outside the Tribal Council); CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. 
XV, § 9 (empowering tribal members to call a constitutional convention by referendum and prohibiting the Tribal 
Council from calling a convention; requiring majority approval for any resulting constitutional changes; and requiring 
submission of questions of constitutional convention to voters once every twenty years).  
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Despite their subnational status, tribal constitutions’ stance on these founding decisions affects both the 
scope and authority of the tribe itself, confronting issues central to constitutional meaning. 
 
  First, defining the respective authority of existing tribal government officials and tribal members 
ensures endorsement, deters obstructionism from existing officials, and encourages genuine buy-in from 
the people.144 The Cherokee reform process seemingly managed to accomplish these feats despite a 
major intra-branch dispute, the tribal council approving a Constitutional Convention whose suggestions 
would be mandatory rather than advisory, and a Constitutional Commission that remained independent 
from the existing government by receiving guarantees of equal representation for each of the three 
branches of government.145 The independent Constitutional Commission agreed to take an oath of 
political neutrality, pledged not to hold public office, and agreed to act only with unanimity.146 At the 
same time, the Cherokee held a wide-ranging series of around twenty public hearings for all members 
who wished to voice concerns that should be embodied in constitutional reform.147 Following the 
hearings, the Commission held a nine day Constitutional Convention with seventy-nine delegates, 
including existing government officials and many tribal members chosen solely on the basis of their 
participation in the public hearings.148 
 
 Other tribes have had constitutional reform processes derailed entirely because of association 
with the existing tribal government. A 2002 reform effort among the Turtle Mountain Tribe ultimately 
was rejected by its members because the referendum occurred at a time of growing distrust of the tribal 
council and became equated with a vote against the tribal council chairman rather than a vote on the 
constitution.149 The failure of other tribal reform efforts attributable to dominance by existing officials 
include the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head/Aquinnah, where frequent 
constitutional changes occurred based on the short-term interests of the community as determined by 
the tribal council.150 
 
 Second, tribal constitutional reform can become delayed or derailed when determining necessary 
preconditions to reform, such as defining eligible reform participants. The Cherokee Nation successfully 
handled this issue with respect to off-reservation Cherokees through a series of off-reservation public 
hearings and invitations to off-reservation convention delegates. These actions eventually culminated in a 
constitutional provision allotting two at-large seats in the tribal council for representation of off-
reservation members and enhanced the legitimacy of the resulting constitution among a substantial 
portion of the Cherokee population.151 However, they were less successful in the context of Cherokee 
Freedmen. Prior to BIA approval of the new Cherokee constitution, the tribal council passed a 
referendum excluding Freedmen from tribal membership, which contributed to the federal government’s 
                                                
144  Haberfeld, supra note 142, at 257–62 (suggesting tribal constitutional reform has generally proceeded along 
two models: the most common “technical” route where attorneys or other experts draft a proposed constitution and 
then submit to the people for feedback, and a “political” route where public discussions and solutions informs the initial 
drafting of a new constitution).  
145  Lemont, supra note 26, at 11–14. 
146  Id. at 13. 
147  Id. at 15. 
148  Id. at 16–17. 
149  See Richotte, supra note 27. 
150  Theresa Two Bulls, Firsthand Accounts: Maximizing Citizen Participation and Ownership in Reform Processes, in 
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 281, 282 (Eric D. Lemont 
ed., 2006); Beverly Wright, Firsthand Accounts: Maximizing Citizen Participation and Ownership in Reform Processes, in 
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 272, 274 (Eric D. Lemont 
ed., 2006). 
151  Lemont, supra note 26, at 24–25. 
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failure to recognize the new constitution. Other tribes’ reform processes can highlight existing grievances 
among the community when constitutionalizing existing practices for the first time.152 
 
 The crises facing tribal governments today reflect a shifting moment in their sovereign status, a 
moment that has been viewed as an opportunity for significant constitutional reform. Within and 
responsive to the constraints of their subconstitutional status, tribes are freed to undertake the “higher 
lawmaking” of public deliberation conducive to constitution building.153 The Cherokee reform process 
illustrates this, as the convention occurred against the backdrop of dueling governments with two courts, 
two police forces, a tribal council that had stopped conducting business for more than a year, and an FBI 
investigation into the Principal Chief.154 Like the threat of an ineffective decentralized confederation or 
state secession, tribes facing governance crises are best positioned to craft new founding documents that 
last for generations, or, more likely, reflect this particular moment in tribal self-government. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION: REFORM EVERY TWENTY YEARS 
 
This Essay has proposed that Indian tribal constitutions should be understood in their 
subnational context. The establishment of tribal governance systems under the federal government and 
alongside state governments affects multiple aspects of tribal constitutions’ writing and rewriting, such as 
the relative ease of amendment tempered by a federal approval requirement. It also helps to illuminate 
the continuing role federal oversight plays to structure tribal constitutions despite being well past the 
IRA era’s boilerplate pressures. The Cherokee reform process demonstrates that, even in a time of 
wholesale constitutional reform empowered by expanding tribal economic and governmental self-
determination, federal authority—through both the stick of Secretarial approval and the carrot of 
funding—continues to shape tribal constitutional decisions.155 
 
                                                
152 See Kelly Koepke, New Residency Requirement Targets Non-Members, Angers Pueblo of Isleta, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/04/09/new-residency-
requirement-targets-nonmembers-angers-pueblo-of-isleta-107140 (noting the provision requiring criminal background 
check for nonmembers to live on reservations might be unusual in terms of its written nature, but the practice is not: 
“Lots of tribes are asking people to leave, especially when people bring in boys and girls dealing with drugs . . . Most 
tribes don’t have these kind of ordinances written into laws, though—they are more traditional tribes without 
constitutions.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
153 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 73 (chronicling the development of the United States Constitution and 
federal structure). 
154  Lemont, supra note 26, at 2. 
155 Any loss of federal funding threatens essential services provided by federally recognized Indian tribes, as 
experienced by tribes during the fiscal year 2013 sequestration and the October 2013 government shutdown. See, e.g., 
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBES URGE CONGRESS TO HONOR TREATY PROMISES AND STOP SEQUESTRATION 
(2013), available at http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal-governance/budget-and-approprations/2013.09.18_Treaty_ 
Promises,_Updated_Sequestration_Paper_revised_copy.pdf (describing sequestration cutbacks of more than $500 
million to federal programs in Indian Country, including impacts to education, essential government services, public 
safety and health care); Dan Frosch, Pulling Aid Away, Shutdown Deepens Indians’ Distress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/us/pulling-aid-away-shutdown-deepens-indians-distress.html?_r=0 (describing 
effects of government shutdown on Indian tribes, including furloughs, the lack of bus service and home health services 
for sick tribal members, and the halting of funding to tribal governments). Funding through the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
supports 183 schools and dormitories, thirty-three tribal colleges and “social services, natural resources management, 
economic development, law enforcement and detention services, administration of tribal courts, implementation of land 
and water claim settlements, replacement and repair of schools, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges, repair of 
structural deficiencies on high hazard dams, and land consolidation activities.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2014 IA-GS-2, available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xocfo/documents/text/idc1-021730.pdf. The total allocation to services through 
Indian Affairs in FY2012 was $2.75 billion dollars. Id. at IA-OVW-1. 
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However, this Essay has also proposed that constitutional borrowing and influences between 
tribes and other entities are not unidirectional. Both the Cherokee Nation Constitution and the State of 
Oklahoma’s Constitution include a provision requiring voters to consider whether to call a constitutional 
convention at least once every twenty years: 
 
No convention shall be called by the Council to propose a new Constitution, unless the 
law providing for such convention shall first be approved by the People on a 
referendum vote at a regular or special election. Any amendments, alterations, revisions 
or new Constitution, proposed by such convention, shall be submitted to the registered 
voters of the Cherokee Nation at a general or special election and be approved by a 
majority of the registered voters voting thereon before the same shall become effective. 
The question of such proposed convention shall be submitted to the citizens of the 
Cherokee Nation at least once every twenty (20) years.156 
 
Aligned with Jefferson’s warning about the inappropriateness of long-term constitutional documents that 
bind future generations, the provision requires members to consider the desirability of major 
constitutional reform at least once every twenty years, although it does not specify exactly when. 
 
While this could be a simple case of the tribe borrowing from the state, the example is more 
complicated. The Oklahoma state constitutional delegation included representatives from Oklahoma’s 
“Five Civilized Tribes,” including the Principal Chief of the Cherokee. Shortly before the Oklahoma 
convention, these delegates had participated in the Sequoyah Constitutional Convention as part of the 
Indian Territory’s attempts to gain its own statehood.157 The Convention produced a constitution 
overwhelmingly ratified by territory voters, but Congress expressed little enthusiasm for an Indian state 
and instead supported joint statehood through Oklahoma. As a result, various principles and structures 
embodied in the Sequoyah Constitution found their way into the Oklahoma constitution.158 
 
As the Twenty Year Provision suggests, although tribes rewrite their constitutions under a 
subnational backdrop, they also actively participate in a dialogue that not only resolves internal tribal 
questions—arranging those limited sets of powers Congress and the Supreme Court have found 
“appropriate” for tribes to retain—but also engages with other subnational entities (i.e. states) and the 
federal system itself. Tribal constitution rewriting remains an inevitably subordinated enterprise, with or 
without the pressures of IRA boilerplate and field agents, but also an enterprise that possesses the 
opportunity to shift the landscape of the American constitutional structure itself. 
 
                                                
156 CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art XV, § 9; see also OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 2. Besides Oklahoma, 13 other 
states require the legislature to periodically submit the calling of a convention to the people. TARR, supra note 82, at 25. 
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